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Throughout the 1990s, the supply of new condominiums in Tokyo significantly 
increased while prices persistently fell. This paper investigates whether the market 
power of condominium developers is a factor in explaining the outcome in this 
market and whether there is a relationship between production cost trend and the 
degree of market power that the developers were able to exercise. In order to 
respond to these questions, a dynamic durable goods oligopoly model of the 
condominium market—one incorporating time-variant costs and a secondary 
market—is constructed and structurally estimated using a nested GMM procedure. 
On the basis of estimates and counterfactual experiments using the estimated 
model, the following results are obtained. First, the data provide no evidence that 
firms in the primary market have substantial market power in this industry. Second, 
the counterfactual experiment provides evidence that inflationary and deflationary 
expectations on production cost trends have asymmetric effects to the market 
power of condominium producers: the increase in their markup when cost inflation 
is anticipated is significantly higher than the decrease in the markup when the same 
magnitude of cost deflation is anticipated. 
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Throughout the 1990s, the supply of new condominiums in Tokyo increased signiﬁcantly while
prices of condominiums fell persistently. In 1994, the annual supply of condominium units surged
from 8,000 units to 20,200 units and has maintained an increasing trend ever since. Meanwhile, the
average rate of decrease in condominium prices is 5.2 percent. It has been believed that a major
cause of this deﬂationary price trend is land price depreciation—such as has taken place since the
burst of the asset price bubble in the Japanese economy, inasmuch as land is the most expensive
factor of condominium production. At the same time, the top 15 ﬁrms have maintained control of
about one-half of the market, despite the entrance of new developers. This fact may suggest that
those top ﬁrms exercise market power, and, therefore, the price fall of condominiums may not only
be due to the cost reduction but also to the change in their markup. This paper investigates how
much market power the large developers exercised in the Tokyo condominium market and how the
deﬂationary cost trend aﬀects the market power of durable goods producers.
In the durable goods market, with focus on a secondary market such as the condominium
market, the degree of market power possessed by producers is worth investigating further because
theoretical predictions are ambiguous. When there is no secondary market, it has been well known
since Coase (1972) that rational expectations of consumers can erode the market power of a durable
good producer by generating competition with one’s past self as well as one’s future self, unless
one can commit to a future price path; buyers will not purchase a product at their valuation of the
product since they correctly anticipate the producer’s incentive to cut its price in the future.1 When
there is a secondary market, however, theoretical predictions are inconclusive regarding the degree
of market power because of the several competing eﬀects of the secondary market on the primary
market. On one hand, the secondary market provides more varieties of imperfect substitutes to
newly produced goods within and across time, and thus it reduces the market power of producers.
On the other hand, the secondary market provides an opportunity for owners of durable goods to
replace current holdings more easily, and, thus, it increases the demand for new goods and market
power. Furthermore, given future resale possibilities, consumers may prefer the goods that yield
higher resale values rather than simply inexpensive goods. Hence, the degree of market power of
1This stark conjecture by Coase—that monopoly results in a perfectly competitive outcome—was later formally
proven by several researchers, among them Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986).
1producers depends on which of those eﬀects dominates in a market.
In order to measure the degree of market power in the Tokyo condominium market and investi-
gate the relationship between the market power and cost deﬂation, we construct a dynamic Cournot
oligopoly model based on Esteban (2001) that explicitly incorporates the secondary market. In our
model, the products are diﬀerentiated by vintage, and producers face a cost function that varies
across time. Using building-level supply data, the proposed model is structurally estimated via
a nested GMM procedure, in which, following Rust (1987), Markov perfect Nash equilibrium of
the model is solved for at each iteration. Using estimated parameter values, we performed several
counterfactual experiments.
There are few empirical studies on supply dynamics of durable goods. Notable exceptions are
Ramey (1989), who studies the Coase problem—inability of the monopolistic producer to gain a
proﬁt—in the US automobile market, and Esteban and Shum (2006) who extend Esteban’s model
into a vertically diﬀerentiated product framework. They ﬁnd that secondary markets allow ﬁrms
to exploit their asymmetries. A producer of goods at the high end of the quality spectrum tends
to produce more, as this can hurt the proﬁts of producer of low-quality products without seriously
hurting his or her own proﬁt; this is because his or her product will act more as a substitute for
newly produced low-quality goods once it reaches the secondary market.2 In contrast to Esteban
and Shum, our model is not restricted to vertical diﬀerentiation; thus, the problem is not formulated
as a linear quadratic but as a more general dynamic problem.
Relative to literature on durable goods supply, there is a growing empirical literature on demand
dynamics of consumer durables where the supply dynamics are a given, beginning with Melnikov
(2000). He models the consumer’s purchase behavior as an optimal stopping problem and develops
an estimation procedure by extending the framework of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Sub-
sequent works on this framework include Nair (2004), Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007), Gordon
(2007), Carranza (2007) and Schiraldi (2007); all of them incorporate a dynamic programming algo-
rithm to solve the consumer’s optimal stopping problem following Rust (1987) in their estimation.
All but Schiraldi give no explicit consideration of the presence of the secondary market.
The relationship between the production cost and market power of a durable goods producer
2Porter and Sattler (1999) point out that there exists similar beneﬁts of a secondhand market for durable goods
producers as in the diﬀerentiated product market. The number of units sold is increased by giving low-valuation
consumers a chance to obtain durable goods, and by reducing the incentive of producers to cut prices in order to sell
to those low-valuation consumers.
2is investigated by Kahn (1986). He suggests that increasing production costs mitigates the Coase
problem inasmuch as buyers believe correctly that producers beneﬁt from spreading production over
time, and, thus, will not cut prices in the near future.3 Based on Kahn’s intuition, it is expected
that, faced with rising costs, producers will have incentives to produce now rather than in the
future. Correspondingly, consumers will correctly believe that producers will not cut prices in the
future. On the contrary, deﬂationary costs provide ﬁrms with incentives to postpone production in
order to cut costs.
Durability is also considered an important characteristic in the literature on housing supply.
Within that literature, the closest approach to the one used in our paper is the investment approach,
whereby consumers consider a residential building as an investment good, the price of which is
determined by the present discount value of the rental price (i.e., the price of the service derived from
the structure).4 The rental price is a function of the level of the existing housing stock. Consumers,
therefore, do not explicitly make distinctions between vintages. Homebuilders maximize the present
discount value of the proﬁt by taking the price as given. Poterba (1984) and Topel and Rosen (1988)
are the examples in this strand. They all assume a competitive market, something rationalized by
the fact that new construction is a small part of the existing stock; consequently, builders do
not have any control over it. In our application, inasmuch as there seems to exist a distinction
between newly constructed units and old units in the minds of consumers, we allow for strategic
interactions between builders. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt at considering the housing
market in an oligopolistic framework using an investment-based approach. One of a few micro level
empirical studies on housing supply is Rosenthal (1999), who tests the eﬃciency market hypothesis
that implies perfect competition. He ﬁnds that the deviation between new building prices and
construction costs disappears faster than the time required for construction, indicating that the
builders of single-family housing in Vancouver do not have excess proﬁt opportunities. This paper
approaches the housing market in a more structural manner, both on the demand and supply sides.
3Bulow (1982) points out that the capacity constraint might work similarly to increasing costs in an inﬁnite horizon
framework. Karp and Perloﬀ (1996) endogenize the technology choice made by a monopolist, thus showing that he
or she is able to beneﬁt from an inferior technology as it allows him or her to credibly commit to low production.
Kutsoati and Zabojnik (2005) also ﬁnd that there exists an incentive for a durable goods monopolist seller to adopt
an inferior technology using a model of technology selection where “learning-by-doing” is present.
4The alternative is the urban spatial approach, which considers an equilibrium wherein the stock of housing always
equals the size of the urban population. Under such conditions, the supply of housing is equal to the inﬂow of new
persons (i.e., the increase in the population). Land is deﬁned here as a distinct input and its price is endogenously
determined by the housing stock.
3The results are summarized as follows: First, there is no evidence that ﬁrms in the primary
market have substantial market power in this industry—thus, the imperfect competition does not
contribute to the observed deﬂation of prices and increased output. Second, the inﬂation in the
production costs strengthens the market power of the condominium producers, whereas deﬂation
of the production costs exacerbates the erosion of the market power derived from the durability
of condominiums; increase in markup when cost inﬂation is anticipated is signiﬁcantly higher than
decrease in markup when the same magnitude of cost deﬂation is anticipated.
Given that the impact of the housing market on the overall economy is substantial, understand-
ing the relationship between market power and the cost trend in the housing market is important
for the policymakers. For example, to accurately measure the eﬀect of a new housing policy—for
instance, that concerning a preferential tax system—one needs to understand the degree of diﬀer-
ence in the response of producers to policy changes under diﬀerent cost phases. More generally, a
knowledge of the impact of market power in diﬀerent cost trends in the durable goods industry is
valuable for understanding the impact of changes in factor prices and scheduling revision of the tax
code or analyzing merger cases.
This paper proceeds in the following manner. The next section gives a description of the Tokyo
condominium market. Section 3 introduces a dynamic oligopoly model of condominium suppliers.
Section 4 explains the estimation method for the model. Section 5 reports the estimation results
followed by the simulation results. The last section concludes.
2 The Tokyo Condominium Market
2.1 Deﬁnition of the Market and the Product
This paper studies the market for newly constructed condominiums in the Tokyo metropolitan
area. A condominium is deﬁned as multi-unit housing that consists of ﬁve or more units, with three
stories or more, and with a steel-reinforced concrete structure. In this paper, we only consider those
units that are developed by private companies.5 We deﬁne the market as encompassing 23 central
5The public entity known as the Japan Public Housing Corporation (JPHC) has been the alternative seller of
condominiums and has provided both rental housing and housing for sale since 1955. Its average annual national
supply of housing units for sale of all types was approximately 13,000 units. Those units are excluded from our
analysis, as the inﬂuence of this entity on the Tokyo market is likely to be insigniﬁcant. Additionally, given the
growing trend toward privatization and the abundance of housing in urban areas, it retreated from the sales business
4districts in Tokyo. It is 621.45 square kilometers in size, and, in 1995, consisted of about 3.5 million
households.6 Throughout the 1990s, population growth was moderate within this area, while the
number of households grew at an annual rate of 1 percent. This growth is mostly accounted for
by an increase in single-person households. Condominiums have become an increasingly common
form of housing in the area—as of 1998, multi-unit housing owned by individuals accounted for 20
percent of all housing in the Tokyo metropolitan area. As of 2001, more than half of all households
purchasing new housing chose a condominium unit rather than a single detached house. This ratio
was about 45 percent on average throughout the 1990s.7
Based on the national tax law as of 1999, the statutory useful life of a condominium unit is
47 years. In reality, most existing condominiums are said to require either large scale repair or
rebuilding after about 30 years. However, the physical and quality depreciation of a condominium
depends on the maintenance quality over the years. Thus, the vintage may not be the best proxy
for quality. This fact motivates us to incorporate other characteristics in the demand speciﬁcation
at the estimation stage, which is described in section 4.8
2.2 The Market Environment
Figure 1 summarizes the various price indices relating to the housing market between 1984 and
2002, taking 1995 as the base year. The expansion of the economy started in 1986. During the
subsequent four years, the annual real GDP growth rate in Japan was about 5 percent. The burst
of the asset price bubble started at the stock market during 1990 and the real GDP growth rate
in the following decade was about 1 percent, on average. The burst of the land market bubble
gradually prevailed in 1991, a year later than the stock market crash. By that time, the residential
land prices in Tokyo had risen by 122 percent from their 1986 level. Since the burst, land prices
have been consistently decreasing. In the face of the devastated economy and declining asset prices,
in 1999.
6The corresponding statistics for New York City in 2004 are as follows: an area of 785 square kilometers (approx-
imately 303 square miles), encompassing 3 million households and 8.1 million people.
7These data are from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Housing (2004):“Tokyo Housing White
Paper—Fiscal Year 2003” (in Japanese) and the Mizuho Corporate Bank Industry Survey Division (2003): “Mizuho
Industry Survey: An Overview of the Condominium Market in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area” (in Japanese).
8In 2002, units that were older than 30 years constituted 6 percent of the total condominiums in Tokyo. The
increasing proportion of aged stock for condominiums is becoming a regulatory concern for safety reasons. In par-
ticular, condominiums built before 1981 were designed under a weaker regulation code, and, thus, do not satisfy
current building standards. In many cases, the re-building of condominiums has proven diﬃcult, as the law requires
an approval of re-building plans by four-ﬁfths of the owners of units in the building.
5quite a few companies had to sell their unused lots, some of which were suitable for condominium
construction: for all condominiums built between 1995 and 2000 in central areas of Tokyo, about 60
percent of sites were formerly owned by the corporate sector. The prices of new condominiums in
Tokyo showed almost identical movement with land prices through 1993, presumably because land
was the most expensive factor in condominium production.9 Meanwhile, construction work price
deﬂators reﬂecting the material and labor costs in the construction industry displayed a gradual
increase, but the movement was very modest compared with the ﬂuctuation in land-related prices.
The rental index (not shown in Figure 1) exhibited a slight decrease over time, but again, the
change has been mild compared with that for land prices, and might reﬂect the fact that land
prices have not been fully adjusted for non-bubble prices.10 After 1993, land price series and new
condominium price series started to show a divergence. Land prices depreciated 1 to 5 percent
more rapidly than condominium prices between 1993 and 2000. It might suggest the presence of
market power. In other words, the decline in factor price may not be fully reﬂected in sales prices.
Alternative explanations can be that the construction costs become more expensive relative to land
prices, and, thus, the total cost falls slower than the land prices.11 Furthermore, technological
innovation made it possible to build taller condominiums, and, thus, the average size of land and
the average cost of land for each unit decreased. Nevertheless, in this paper, we focus on the
possibility that the market outcome is dictated by the market power.
2.3 The Industry
Condominium construction involves at least two types of ﬁrms: developers and construction com-
panies. Developers acquire land, plan condominium development projects and place the order for
construction with the construction companies. Developers either sell the units directly to con-
sumers or through dealer companies. In this study, developers are assumed to produce and sell
condominium units directly to consumers and the role of construction companies is abstracted away.
9The greater part of condominium ownership included sectional ownership of land.
10Under an eﬃcient market assumption, the theoretical price of an asset is the present discount value of the expected
ﬂow of income gain from the asset. Thus, the value of a house has to be equal to the present discount value of a
future rental stream. For example, if the expected rent is ﬁxed to today’s level, the land price is proportional to the
rent. This means that the land price and rental price indices must be identical.
11It may not be applicable, however, to condominium construction costs since there were news reports that the
large contractors took orders at very low prices facing decreasing proﬁtable orders from the public sector during the
1990s.
6One of the contributors to the surge in the supply in 1994 was new entrants to the market. The
transition in market participants is summarized in Table 1. The number of active ﬁrms was 111 in
1993, which increased to 205 in 1994, and has stayed around 230 since then. For each year, about
13-27 percent of ﬁrms appeared in the data set only once over the sample period of seven years.
Those ﬁrms or individuals seemed to take advantage of the market expansion to sell their unused
land. At the same time, the top 15 ﬁrms maintained a market share of more than 50 percent during
the period of analysis, despite the large number of entries.
On average, condominium construction takes 15 months.12 The average time lag in the sample
between construction and sales is about 198 days and about 10 percent of the properties are sold
before the completion of construction. It is common to divide the units from one project into
groups and sell them at diﬀerent phases. Our dataset is organized by the sales phases. While the
actual production decisions tend to be made well ahead of sales time, we assume that transaction
and production choices occur at the same time.
2.4 The Secondary Markets
It is said that the resale housing market in Japan is less developed than its counterpart in North
America. The trade volume in the secondary market has been estimated at 50,000 units annually
in the Tokyo metropolitan area alone. This accounts for 3 percent of the condominium stock in
the area.13
Three factors are commonly recognized as sources of the low volume of transactions in the
secondary market. First, there is a strong preference towards newly constructed housing in Japan.
According to the survey of housing demand conducted by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport, more than 50 percent of households preferred newly built housing in 2003. Second,
there are substantial information asymmetry problems in the Japanese real estate market. Real
estate brokers tend to be small scale and specialize in speciﬁc areas; they are thus inclined to
monopolize local information. This leads to higher search costs for potential buyers and higher
opportunity costs derived from vacancies for owners or potential sellers. Shimizu, Nishimura, and
12This data is according to Maeda, Susumu (2005): “The Outlook for the Market for Houses Built for Sale—
Inventory of Condominiums,” the Japanese Economy Insight, Mizuho Research Institute.
13The percentage of aged home transactions in all home transactions in Japan was 11.8 percent in 2001. It is
exceptionally small compared with the corresponding ﬁgures in the US (76.1 percent), the UK (88.2 percent) and
France (71.4 percent).
7Asami (2004) focus on this point and ﬁnd that there would be substantial cost savings if there were
an information agency that provided relevant information to all (potential) market participants on
all properties for resale, for almost zero cost. Although this suggests that information asymmetry
may be important in this market, this paper maintains the assumption of a perfectly competitive
secondary market. Third, the transactions cost is rather high. There are various fees in housing
markets including real estate acquisition tax, the national registration tax, stamp duty, capital
gains tax if the sales are for replacement, brokerage fees, as well as the opportunity costs for sellers
mentioned above. Additionally, Kanemoto (1997) points out that the favorable loan treatment
for homebuyers of newly constructed houses by the Japan Housing Loan Corporation increases
the relative cost of purchasing aged housing.14 Nevertheless we maintain the assumption that the
secondary market is perfect.
3 Model of the Condominium Market
This section gives a description of the dynamic oligopoly model for the primary market for condo-
miniums. The model is constructed based on the discrete-time semidurable goods oligopoly model
of Esteban (2001), wherein both ﬁrms and consumers are forward looking. The behavior of con-
sumers is modeled using a multinomial logit framework but the model incorporates the dynamics
arising from durability.15 Firms are quantity-setting oligopolists facing a macro cost shock and
stochastically evolving fringe competitors.
3.1 The Environment and the Transition of the States
Condominiums are durable and are assumed to last for D periods. Newly constructed condomini-
ums are traded in the oligopoly market, whereas older condominiums are traded in competitive
secondary markets. Thus, the producers do not have direct control over the outcome in secondary
markets. The condominium units are diﬀerentiated by vintage, implying that they are homoge-
neous within the same vintage. There are three types of state variables in this model: the stock of
condominiums,   st, the macro cost shock, ˜ ct, and the supply of fringe competitors, xt.
14Japan Housing Loan Corporation was a government aﬃliated and the largest single mortgage lender in Japan.
The corporation is privatized in 2006.
15This modeling approach is employed by Berkovec (1985) with respect to car consumption.
8In the market, there exist J ﬁrms producing and selling durable condominiums. Firms are
indexed by j and are assumed to be homogenous. A typical ﬁrm j produces qjt units of condo-
miniums at time t. Besides J ﬁrms, there are fringe competitors who take the price as a given.
They collectively produce xt units at time t. It is assumed that xt evolves due to an AR(1) process
(i.e., xt = x + ϑxt−1 + ξt,where ξt is distributed mean 0 and is ﬁnite variance σ2
ξ.).16 Therefore, xt
eventually converges to the steady-state level, xss. If current xt is below xss, it would be in a growth
phase. The condominium market for each vintage clears for each period. Thus, all existing units
are transacted in the secondary market of each vintage until they reach age D. A condominium
unit depreciates at an annual rate of 1 − δ before age D. Note that units above age D stay in the
market, but as part of an outside alternative. In other words, after age D, the speciﬁc links of used










Firm j incurs cost to produce qj,t according to the quadratic cost function:
C(q0
j,t,˜ ct)=( ¯ c1 +˜ ct)qj,t +¯ c2q2
j,t, (1)
where ¯ c1 and ¯ c2 are constants, while ˜ ct is stochastic, following an AR(1) process to capture macro
shocks to the market. Formally, it is expressed as ˜ ct+1 = ρ˜ ct + ηt+1, where ρ ∈ (0,1) is the
persistence parameter and ηt+1 is white noise (i.e., independently and identically distributed over
time with mean zero and a ﬁnite variance, σ2
η). The cost function is common among the J ﬁrms,
which observe ˜ ct when making production decisions.
Let   qt be a vector consisting of the production of the J ﬁrms. The above speciﬁcations on stock,
exogenous production and cost determine the law of motion, as follows:
16This treatment of exogenous competitors is similar to that of exporters in the US automaker model used by














































































































































































⎦. 00 is a D × 1 vector of zeros, 01 is a
D×2 matrix of zeros and 02 is a 2×D matrix of zeros. For notational convenience, we denote the
vector of the state variables as   St =[   s 





The decision of consumers about condominium purchases are modeled using a discrete-choice logit
framework. There are M consumers in the market and they are indexed by i. For each period,
a typical consumer i purchases, at most, one unit from a set of condominiums, of age 0,1,...D.
The age 0 product is traded in the primary market while older units are traded in a competitive
secondary market. The owner of a new condominium unit can sell it in the secondary market after
holding it for at least a year. The owner of a condominium unit of age D receives a terminal value
p at the end of the year. The product is indexed by its age, denoted by d. The outside alternative
is denoted by d = n, and it includes the choice of purchasing single-unit housing, condominiums
older than D, or not buying any type of housing (i.e., renting).








it if d =0 ,1,...D,
ed
it if d = n,
(3)
where g(.) is a function of the age of the product (d) and measures the quality of the product, pd
t
is the price of the product, and ed
it captures the heterogeneity of consumers that is unobservable
by the econometrician. These follow some zero mean ﬁnite-variance distributions independently
10across time and age. Let J =[ 1 ,...,J] be a set of active ﬁrms in the market and D =[ 0 ,1,...D]a
set of available vintages for those products. Consumer i maximizes the sum of his or her present
discounted utility ﬂow by making choice (d) from set D + 1. Given the consumer’s time discount







This problem involves cumbersome dynamic programming. However, it is known that the
problem can be simpliﬁed to a static one by assuming that there are no transaction costs. Berkovec











it if d ≤ D,
ed
it if d = n.
The expected capital cost ECCd








t+1 if d<D ,
pd
t − βp if d = D,
where p is the terminal or scrap value of the condominium when it reaches age D in period t+1. It
implies that a consumer’s dynamic decision is equivalent to a comparison of the utility gains from
the choices available in the period. The utility gain consists of terms g(d), the beneﬁt from the
consumption of the goods for the given period, and pd
t − βpd+1
t+1, the implicit rental price under the
assumption of no transaction costs. Here, consumers have perfect foresight, such that Et(pd+k
t+k)=
pd+k
t+k for all t and k =0 ,1,D+1 . This assumption is relaxed at the estimation stage.17
The unobserved heterogeneity of consumers, ed
it, is assumed to be identically and independently
distributed with respect to the type I extreme value distribution across consumers (i), vintage(d)
and time (t). Integrating  d
it then yields a market share equation for each vintage as follows:
17Berkovec (1985) considers stochastic breakdown and the possibility of scrap for automobiles. Correspondingly,
the expected capital cost takes these possible events into consideration. In the case of condominiums, because a
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for d = n.
(5)
Applying the transformation method of Berry (1994), the logarithms of μd
t and μn
t are taken and
their diﬀerences are given by the following expression:
lnμd
t(pt,p t+1) − lnμn
t (pt,p t+1)=g(d) − αECCd
t , (6)
= g(d) − αpd
t + αβpd+1
t+1, (7)
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M if d =0 ,
sd
t







M if d = n.
(8)
Iterating over the future expected capital cost ECC, together with some manipulations, yields the













= P0(  st,x t,x t+1,...,xt+D,  qt,  qt+1,...  qt+D). (10)
It shows that the price of each new product depends not only on today’s production (  qt,x t), but
also on that of the future (  qt+k,x t+k, k =1 ,...D) and of the past (  st), through the outside market
share μn
t+d.
Given this inverse demand function, the description of a ﬁrm’s problem is given in the next
section.
3.3 Firms
Firms are competing in a Cournot quantity setting game. Condominium development requires a
long period of planning and it is diﬃcult to make quick adjustments in terms of the number of units
being supplied once a development plan is approved by the authorities. Thus, it is reasonable to
12consider the production level as a strategic variable of a ﬁrm. Given the inverse demand function
of a new product (9) and the cost function (1), ﬁrm j chooses the level of production to maximize






τqjτ − C(qjτ,  cτ)
 
. (11)
Because of the dependence of new condominium prices on the current, future and past pro-
duction of the entire condominium stock (i.e., of all ﬁrms), any given ﬁrm’s production strategy
may depend on the entire history of its production. The convenient assumption is to allow the
production plans of all ﬁrms at time t to depend only on the stock of condominiums that is actively
being traded in the market at any given time. This assumption corresponds to the concept of a
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, which is a subgame perfect equilibrium where actions are only
functions of payoﬀ-relevant state variables, as deﬁned in Maskin and Tirole (1988a, 1988b). In the
current problem, the payoﬀ-relevant variables are the state variables (  St), as deﬁned in section 3.1.









τqjτ − C(qjτ,  cτ)
 
, (12)
subject to (2) and
qjt = hj(  St), (13)
and









qj t = hj (  St),j   =1 ,2,...j − 1,j+1 ,...J, (15)
where hl(·) is the stationary policy function for ﬁrm l. The constraints (13) and (15) ensure that
the solution is a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. The expectation operator in the inﬁnite sum
in problem (12) is over the ηs and ξs, s = t,t +1 ,..... The constraint (14) restricts the choice of
production so there is no oversupply. At equilibrium, the policy functions that rational ﬁrms use
to forecast future production, both their own and that of competitors, coincides with the optimal
policy for each. Note that, in this case, the equilibrium strategy is time consistent.
13The problem stated by equations (12) to (15) gives the following Bellman equation:
Vj(  St) = max
qjt
 
Eπjt(  St,q jt,  q−jt,{  qτ}D
τ=t+1)+βEVj(  St+1|  qt)
 
, (16)
subject to (2), and (13) for j =1 ,...,J.   q−jt denotes a vector of production at time t, for all ﬁrms
but j. It can be further simpliﬁed as follows:
Vj(  St) = max
qjt
 




where the vector H(  Sτ)=[ h1(  Sτ),...,hJ(  Sτ)]  stands for the vector of (expected) future production
given the state   Sτ. To obtain tractability and overcome the computational burden, we focus only
on symmetric equilibria, so that hj(  Sτ)=h(  Sτ) for all j.
3.4 Discussions about Some Assumptions
In this section, we discuss four assumptions that, while important in implementing the estimation,
are certainly not innocuous in other respects. First, products are diﬀerentiated only by vintage.
Thus, condominiums are homogeneous within the same vintage and the quality of the product in
a given vintage is constant for each given time. Although the data suggests that each year there
exists great variation in the characteristics of new condominiums, and that those characteristics
change over time, this assumption is nonetheless maintained, as the focus of the current paper is
on the durability of condominiums.18 This simpliﬁcation implies that ﬁrms take the quality of each
rival’s product as a given; likewise, that they consider a stated quality as being the same as their
own.
Second, ﬁrms are homogeneous. This restriction, together with the ﬁrst assumption, greatly
reduces the dimensionality of the problem by allowing a structure wherein the policy function only
depends on common variables (i.e. total stock, exogenous production and macro cost shock), rather
than also on ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. It also enables us to impose a symmetric equilibrium when
solving the model. If ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are included in the set of state variables, the dimension
of the problem grows with the number of the ﬁrms, and the problem becomes intractable. The gain
from these assumptions is that we are only required to solve the problem for a single agent and do
18Treating the products of oligopolistic ﬁrms and the product of fringe ﬁrms is unlikely to be problematic. The
estimation of the probability that a unit is provided by a fringe ﬁrm, controlling for characteristics and year eﬀects,
using the probit indicates that there are no substantial diﬀerences between the products of two types of ﬁrms.
14not have to worry about multiple equilibria. A drawback from this restriction is that the model
does not explain the variation in the production level across ﬁrms, something which is observed in
the data. Instead, this is dealt with using idiosyncratic production errors, as described in section
4.
Third, the terminal value of the condominium unit is ﬁxed. This assumption permits us to
obtain an analytical expression for the inverse demand function in a very simple manner. There
are two shortcomings, however. First, we get a high price elasticity of demand and a low sensitivity
of price to output, inasmuch as the terminal value does not depend on the stock or production.
Second, it is likely that ˜ c is correlated with p, because of the certainty that the value of the
physical building depreciates over time; thus, the price gets much closer to the land price as it
ages. Nevertheless, it is diﬃcult to infer the relationship between these variables unless we impose
further structure on them, as we do not directly observe ˜ c.
Fourth, ˜ c is treated as being exogenous. Hence, the cost, mainly as reﬂecting the land price,
is not allowed to be endogenous; if the project involves the development of a large community,
large-scale condominium construction could raise the value of the land.
4 Estimation
The set of structural parameters in the model described above is Θ = [¯ x,ϑ,σ2
ξ,α,β,δ,¯ p,{g(d)|d =
0,1,...D},¯ c1,¯ c2,ρ,σ2
η]. This section describes the estimation strategy of those parameters in three
steps. The third step involves the dynamic programming algorithm in the standard GMM procedure
following Rust (1987). Note that various estimation approaches for dynamic games have been
recently developed; among others, Hotz, Miller, Sanders, and Smith (1994), Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2002) and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) are computationally less expensive compared
with the nested ﬁxed point approach. However, two features of our model—a continuous choice
variable and a state variable that is common to all agents but unobservable to econometrician—do
not easily allow the direct application of those methods.
154.1 Data
The data for this study are obtained from two sources: primary market data for the years from
1990 to 2000 are taken from the yearly publication “Condominium Apartment Market Trends,”
as constructed by the Real Estate Economic Institute; and secondary market data are taken from
periodical advertisements entitled “Weekly Housing Information,” for the years 1992 to 2002, as
published by Recruit Co., Ltd..
The unit of observation in the ﬁrst dataset corresponds to a group of units in one development
project that are sold at the same sales timing, called a phase. While 26 units on average are sold
in a phase from one project, one phase could contain as many as 319 units. The data include
the names of buildings, their addresses, the closest train stations, distances to stations, the names
of developers, the names of builders, as well as other characteristics. Some of those variables are
summarized in Table 2. The ﬁfth column reports the mean of the variables weighted by the number
of units to grasp the distribution of the variables in terms of units. This table displays the large
variety of characteristics in the sample, as is common in any real estate data at the micro level. As
described in the previous section, the model imposes that all products within the same vintage are
homogeneous. However, we took advantage of the richness of the microlevel data.
The second set of data is organized by unit. Two datasets are merged using common information
such as the names of buildings and addresses. However, for each given time, the majority of
condominiums are not traded; furthermore, the “Weekly Housing Information” advertisements do
not cover all the properties on the market; 27 percent of the observations have corresponding
secondary market data. For these reasons, prices for unobserved units are imputed using a linear
regression of prices for each age on variables for various characteristics using data on observed units.
Appendix B describes the method in detail.
The last two sections in Table 2 report the summary statistics for imputed prices. Prices are
adjusted for inﬂation using a GDP deﬂator. The base year is 1995. In order to obtain numerical
stability in the nested algorithm, prices are re-scaled by one millionth, and the units are re-scaled
by one thousandth.
Our model classiﬁes ﬁrms into two types: oligopolistic ﬁrms and fringe ﬁrms. The ﬁrms are
selected by the ranking of the cumulative production during the sample period. The estimation is
16performed for the models of the a ﬁve-ﬁrm oligopoly (model I) and a 10-ﬁrm oligopoly(model II).19
4.2 Fixed Parameters
Some parameters that are ﬁxed in the estimation procedure are summarized in Table 3; these are
ﬁxed in order to implement the estimation.
Two parameters that dictate durability in the model—the lifespan of a condominium unit, D,
and the depreciation factor, δ —are ﬁxed for computational reasons. The value of D is ﬁxed at
one calendar year; thus, a condominium unit lasts in the market for two years, in order to reduce
the dimensionality. Note that as D increases, the number of vintages included in the state vector
increases accordingly. To see the consequence of this treatment, the production paths of monopolists
over a period of 25 years for D = 1 and D = 2 are simulated using the same parameter values.
The results are shown in Figure 2. The diagram indicates that there are no substantial diﬀerences
in the nature of the two series. Although the same parameter values are used, additions to the
vintage increase the value of a steady state; thus, we see the diﬀerence in the levels of production.
Since what is important for the estimation and for the purpose of this study is the property of the
series, this treatment does not cause any substantial diﬀerences in the results.20 It is unlikely that
a condominium unit physically depreciates over the ﬁrst two years of its life. However, we set its
annual depreciation rate, 1 − δ, at 0.01 for two reasons. First, since the precise data of the stock
of condominiums are unavailable, the parameter value cannot be estimated. Second, the numerical
stability of the nested dynamic programming algorithm requires 1 − δ to be strictly greater than
zero.21
The common discount factor for ﬁrms and consumers is ﬁxed at β =0 .975, which reﬂects the
interest rate during this period and follows the convention found in the IO literature. It is known,
in general, that the discount factor tends to be collinear to other parameters in a dynamic model,
and, thus, it is diﬃcult to identify.
As discussed in the previous section, to obtain an analytical expression of the inverse demand
19Top 10 ﬁrms are Daikyo, Mitsui, Recruit Cosmos, Sumitomo, Towa, Cesar, Marubeni, Asahi Construction Dia
Construction, and Nomura Real Estate. These are ordered by the value of the cumulative production. The top ﬁve
ﬁrms were within the top 15 for nine consecutive years between 1992 and 2000.
20For the initial value of this simulation, we used the value corresponding to the 1991 observations for stock and
exogenous production, and the calibrated value for the macro cost shock. The method of calculation for the initial
value of the macro cost shock is described in Appendix C.
21Note that the optimal policy does not substantially change at each set of state variables when δ is reduced further.
17function, the price of a two-year-old unit, p, is considered constant. In the estimation, it is ﬁxed
at 42.3 million yen, which corresponds to the weighted average (imputed) price of a two-year-old
unit between 1994 and 2002.22
The cost parameter ¯ c1 is set at 24.71 million yen, which is equivalent to 61 percent of the
projected cost for 2002.23 This parameter is thought of as constituting the steady state of the
level of the constant portion of the marginal cost. For numerical optimization, we restrict the
sum of ¯ c1 and the macro shock, ˜ ct, so that it is bounded below by zero. If this parameter is to
be estimated, the range of ˜ ct must be adjusted for each iteration, something that increases the
computation time. The variance of the macro cost shock, σ2
η, is normalized at unity, as the policy
function is very insensitive to this parameter. The market size, M, is ﬁxed at 3,514,000, which
is equal to the number of households in the area in 1995, a ﬁgure obtained from the census data.
Thus, outside alternatives include not only condominiums older than two years but also all types
of housing, inclusive of single-unit ownership and “no purchase.” “No purchase” is equivalent to
rental housing.
Given these ﬁxed parameters, the set of structural parameters to be estimated is reduced to Θ =
[¯ x,ϑ,σ2
ξ,α,g(0),g(1),¯ c2,ρ]. In the next subsection, structural errors are introduced. Subsequently,
the three-step estimation procedure is described.
4.3 Econometric Model
To carry out a statistical inference of the model, unobservable stochastic terms must be introduced
so that variations observed in the data are generated by the model.
The key equations for the estimation are the market share equations (6) and the equilibrium
production rule (13). For the demand-side relationship, the assumption about a consumer’s expec-
tation (i.e., perfect foresight) is relaxed, and a rational expectation is assumed instead. Speciﬁcally,





22The simple average of the imputed unit price for the same period was 45.52 million yen, with a standard deviation
of 29.18 million yen.
23Based on an estimate by the industry analyst, non-land costs (i.e., construction cost and sales service cost)
accounts for 61 percent of total cost per unit. For the determination of this parameter, the total cost for 2002 is
projected by setting the average margin to 10 percent for 2000 and applying the growth rate of each cost index.
24Note that the product that was aged d at time t becomes age d +1a tt +1 .
18where Ωt is the information available at time t and νd+1
t,t+1 is the forecast error for vintage d.
For the supply side, an error λjt for ﬁrm j at time t is introduced; thus, the relation between
the observed data and the optimal production rule can be written as:
qjt = h(  St)+λjt,j=1 ,...,J, (19)
where it is assumed that λjt is unobserved by any ﬁrm when making a decision, and that it is
independently and identically distributed as N(0,σ2
λ) across ﬁrms and time. This implies that a
producer integrates out not only its own production errors, but also those of its rivals when solving
the problem (17) although they are not state variables. Note that λjts do not aﬀect the equilibrium
policy function but still allow for the heterogeneity in the realized production. This change in
the assumption adds one more parameter to estimate, σ2
λ.25The assumption that there may be
unexpected adjustments in production at the time of planning may sound restrictive. However,
it is observed that, in some cases, condominium developers purchase condominium buildings from
other developers. Hence λjt can be thought of as constituting such adjustments.
Additionally, the forecast error νd+1
t,t+1 and λjt are assumed to be independent across time, ﬁrms
and vintages. With this assumption, the introduction of νd+1
t,t+1 does not change the problem for the
producer.26
Using forecast errors as the basis for an estimation is not a common approach in the empirical
discrete choice literature, which assumes the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. In this model,
the time-invariant heterogeneity is captured by the term g(d), while time-variant heterogeneity
cannot be introduced, as it will not be consistent with the dynamic problem solved by the producers
unless νd+1
t,t+1 is treated as another state variable. This is not feasible because of computational
diﬃculties. An alternative structure is the introduction of measurement errors. However, as the
equilibrium production rule (19) is not linear for state variables measured using past errors, the
construction of the GMM objective function requires an integration of all past errors. This is not
available, however, given the current computational ability.
25One of the advantages of the GMM procedure over other methods, such as the maximum likelihood estimation, is
that it does not require a parametric assumption of the error term. However, in this model, a parametric assumption
is required, as the current price and proﬁt depends on ωjt, and each ﬁrm solves its own proﬁt maximization problem
with regard to expectation.
26It is because the forecast errors are entered additively to the expected price function that the expected current
period proﬁt function is identical to the one without ν
d+1
t,t+1, so long as it is independent of q or λ.
19The First Step—Estimation of xt Process(¯ x,ϑ,σ2
ξ)
The evolution of xt, the production level of fringe competitors, is estimated using data from 1992 to
2000, by regressing it on its lagged variable (i.e. xt−1). From the residuals, we obtain an estimate
for σ2
ξ. The variable xt is constructed for each model by subtracting the aggregated production of
oligopolistic ﬁrms from the total production in each year.
The Second Step—Estimation of the Demand Parameters (α,g(0),g(1))
Since the model treats all condominiums of the same vintage as homogeneous, the corresponding
data are aggregated by year. Inasmuch as the aggregation makes the number of observations too
few for reasonable estimation, we employ sales phase data (i.e., the lowest level of aggregation)
to estimate the parameters α, g(0) and g(1). Thus, the available variables at this stage are the
averages of the characteristics and prices for the group of units that are sold by a particular ﬁrm
at a particular location in a given sales phase. We index the unit of observation by k and let K
denote the total number of groups of newly produced units. To capture quality variations across
products as produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms, a characteristic vector,   Xd
k,t, is introduced.
Introducing forecast errors νd+1
k,t,t+1 and using phase-level data modify equation (6) as follows:
lnμd
k,t − lnμn









=   Xd
k,tΓ − αCCd
k,t + ωd+1




k,t+1) denotes the realized capital cost of a unit in group k of age d at time
t.
As the disturbance (ωd+1
k,t+1 = αβνd+1
k,t+1) is due to a forecast error, its deﬁnition gives the or-
thogonality condition as below (i.e., given the information set at time t, the expected error on the
forecast is zero). Note that the number of observations increases proportionally to D because each
new condominium will be one-year-old stock in the next period. Between ages, only prices and the





where yk,t consists of variables that are known at time t. Note that Ωt cannot include qk,t,a si t
20is not known when consumers make their choices. The vector yk,t includes a constant and some
characteristic variables. Consistent estimation of the demand parameters, (α,Γ), can be obtained
using a GMM estimator. The parameters for the next estimation step, g(0),and g(1), are obtained
by calculating the mean characteristic vector for each vintage across k and t (   Xd =
  
kt   Xd
k,t),
and by evaluating ˆ g(d)=   Xdˆ Γ for d =0 ,1. By doing this, g(d) becomes ﬁxed to the mean of the
quality for vintage d across time.
The Third Step—Estimation of the Supply Parameters
Given the estimates from the previous steps, we estimate the cost-related parameters, (ρ,σ2
λ,c2),
by estimating eq.(19), using the nested GMM procedure. In this model, where the parametric form
of the policy function is unknown, our data-matching procedure utilizes a function approximation
technique. Note that the alternative method such as utilizing equilibrium conditions cannot avoid
obtaining a solution of the dynamic programming problem because current price is a function of
future productions. Given the variables   zjt, which are orthogonal to λjt, we are able to obtain the
moment condition:
E(  z 
jt · λjt)=0 . (22)
Under the assumptions for λjt, the instruments are the constant, lagged production for two
periods with the exception of its own, and exogenous production (i.e., zjt =[ 1 ,q −j,t−1,q −j,t−2,x t]).










The stacking conditions (22) and (23), together yield E(Zjt ∗ Λjt) = 0, where Zjt is the block








Zjt ∗ Λjt. (24)
For each evaluation of the set of parameter values, the ﬁrms’ dynamic programming problem has
to be solved, as the function h(·) is a function of parameters (ρ,σ2
λ,c2).
The GMM criterion function (24) is, however, not available due to an initial condition problem—
one of the state variables, ˜ c, is unobservable and serially correlated. The feasible objective function
is obtained by integrating out the sequence of ˜ c from (24) using the density of ˜ c. Nevertheless,
21as none of ˜ c are observable, the serial dependence of ˜ c requires a further assumption on its initial
value (or terminal value). In this application, the terminal value ˜ cT is assumed to be nonstochastic
and ﬁxed to the value based on informal information on the cost of condominium production in
the late 1990s. See Appendix C for how we calibrated this value. The feasible moment condition









Zjt ∗ Λjt(  c)f(  c|cT)d  c. (25)
Given a positive deﬁnite weighting matrix ˆ Ξs, the GMM estimator minimizes Υ 
siˆ ΞsΥsi. In the
ﬁrst-stage estimation, we used the inverse of the squared instrument matrix as ˆ Ξs. The results
reported in this paper involve the optimal GMM estimator, which uses a consistent estimator for
E(Υsi ∗ Υ 
si) as a weighting matrix.
4.4 Identiﬁcation
As explained in the ﬁrst and the second estimation steps, identiﬁcations of parameters for the pro-
cess of production by fringe competitors and the demand system are obtained using cross-sectional
and time-series variations of observables: market shares, observed capital costs, and aggregate
production by fringe competitors. However, the identiﬁcation in the third step is not trivial.27
Although the model in this paper fully speciﬁes the parametric form of the return function, those
assumptions alone do not guarantee identiﬁcation. Stated more formally, the objective function
for the estimation (i.e., the optimally weighted quadratic form of the GMM conditions) must be
reasonably sensitive to changes in the parameter values.
In order to gain some ideas about its sensitivity to the parameter values in which we are
interested, we present simulated production paths of a monopolist for diﬀerent values of ¯ c2 and
ρ in Figure 3. The initial value of each simulation is set at the observed value for 1991, and
each run consists of 10,000 simulations over nine periods. The panel on the left shows that the
increase in ¯ c2, the coeﬃcient of the quadratic term in the cost function, decreases the production
at each period but does not greatly change the shape of the path. Thus, it determines the level
of the optimal production. The panel on the right indicates that a low value of ρ, which implies a
smaller persistence of the macro cost shock, ˜ c, generates a hump-shaped path by making ˜ c reach
27For a more precise discussion of nonparametrical identiﬁcation of the dynamic Markov decision problem, see Rust
(1994).
22its steady-state level faster. Hence, the peak of the production occurs later, as ρ increases. At a
higher level of ρ, the peak is not realized within nine periods. Therefore, observed variations of
the level of production can identify ˜ c, and observed shapes of the production paths can identify ρ.
The variance of idiosyncratic production shock, σ2
λ, can be identiﬁed by cross-sectional variations
in production because all heterogeneity among the ﬁrms are summarized in λjt in the model.
5 Results
5.1 The Parameter Estimates
The empirical results are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively, for each estimation step.
The process for xt is estimated for model I (a ﬁve-ﬁrm oligopoly) and model II (a 10-ﬁrm
oligopoly). For both models, the AR(1) coeﬃcient, ϑ, is positive and signiﬁcantly less than one, as
seen in Table 4. The constant term, however, is positive, although not signiﬁcant. These parameter
estimates imply that the process of xt gradually converges towards a positive steady-state value,
xss, which is estimated to be 32,200 units with model I; and 31,160 units with model II.
The demand system is estimated using demand data for the period 1994-1999. This period
includes the year during which the consumption tax rate changed and a new tax preferential
system for homebuyers was implemented; both are likely to have had a large impact on housing
purchase behavior. Nevertheless, we assume that all consumers and ﬁrms anticipated these events
at the beginning of the period.28 All observations appear twice in the estimation in the dataset, as
any given year’s new condominiums become one-year-old units the following year, with the amount
depreciating by 1 − δ. Overall, the dataset consists of 10,113 observations.
Columns (i) and (ii) in Table 5 report the estimates for the demand parameters, by OLS
and GMM, respectively. Since imputed prices are used as the values of the condominium stock,
standard errors must be adjusted for the noise caused by imputation. The correction is performed
using the bootstrap method. Possible endogeneity for expected capital cost is dealt with using the
28The consumption tax was raised from 3 to 5 percent in April 1997, in order to compensate for the ﬁscal loss from
the income tax cut of 1994. Note that the consumption tax is imposed on any consumption expenditure, inclusive of
residential buildings while the value of the land is not subject to it. As a part of its economic stimulus package, in
1999, the government extended the existing tax preferential system to include mortgage payments on housing loans.
The change, which went into eﬀect in 1999 as planned, increased the maximum tax beneﬁt from 1.7 million yen to
5.9 million yen, a 245 percent increase.
23log of its height and the log of the distance from the nearest train station. Both are known at the
time of purchase by potential buyers, and correlate with the value of the property; the distance
from the nearest train station is negatively correlated with the land prices, while the height of
the building is positively correlated with the production costs. The coeﬃcient for expected capital
cost, −α, is estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant for both model speciﬁcations, although the
magnitude’s absolute value is larger when instruments are used, indicating that the forecast error,
ωjt, causes a bias toward zero. The negative value of −α suggests that consumers prefer a good with
a lower capital cost, as expected. The tests for relevance of instruments (the canonical correlations
likelihood-ratio test), endogeneity, and the overidentiﬁcation restriction show that the adopted
instruments are acceptable. Dummy variables for age, which measure the quality of each vintage
after controlling for other characteristic variables, are negative and signiﬁcant for all ages and for all
speciﬁcations, implying that, relative to the outside alternative, consumers value condominium units
less. Among condominiums, new condominiums are valued more than older condominiums, as is
shown by the larger estimated coeﬃcient of the age-0 dummy relative to the age-1 dummy. Having
obtained estimated parameters for the age dummies and the other characteristic variables, the
vintage quality parameters g(d),d=0 ,1 are calculated using the mean values for all characteristic
variables. These are reported in Table 5, and represent the average valuations of consumers for
condominium units for each vintage relative to outside goods. For the two speciﬁcations, the
rankings of these two parameters by age are the same as that for the age dummies.
The cost parameters estimated in the third step are reported in Table 6. Firm-level data for
ﬁve- and 10-oligopolistic ﬁrms over seven periods (from 1994 to 2000) are used. The estimates for ρ
indicate that the macro cost shock is a stationary process for both speciﬁcations. These estimates
from models I and II, imply that the linear coeﬃcient of the cost function, ¯ c1 +˜ ct, is deﬂating
on average, at 2.4 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. The estimated value of ¯ c2 is positive and
signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that this industry’s technology has decreasing returns to scale. This result
reﬂects the fact that, relative to small ﬁrms, large developers are more apt to construct costly
units such as large-scale buildings and high-rise complexes. This implies that large condominium
developers have an incentive to spread production across time, as predicted by Kahn (1986); thus,
they have some ability to commit to a future production plan.
245.2 The Numerical Solution of the Model
In this section, the solution of the producers’ problem with the estimated parameters is presented.
The solution for the model is obtained using a policy function iteration algorithm, that utilizes a
function approximation technique, known as the collocation method, which is described in Appendix
A. The nature of the solution is the same for all values of J (the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms).
Consequently, the result reported in this section is based on model II (J = 10).
The panels in Figure 4 display the contour maps of the resulting policy function corresponding
to eq.(19), the value function, and the price of a new condominium as a function of the macro cost
shock, ˜ ct, and the production of fringe competitors, xt, at the steady-state stock level, (st = sss =
31.16).
Both the policy and value functions decreases for all of the state variables for the age-1 stock, st,
the fringe competitors, xt, and the macro cost shock, ˜ ct. To understand the nature of the optimal
production policy, it is useful to break down the states based on the values of the exogenous state
variables, ˜ ct and xt, relative to their steady states. For instance, if ˜ ct is above zero, the process
shows a decreasing trend; thus, the state describes a deﬂationary period for ˜ ct.I fxt is below the
steady-state value, the process shows an increasing trend and the state describes a growth period.
Table 7 reports the elasticities of the policy function with respect to the state variables for the
diﬀerent exogenous state phases. For example, when the macro cost shock is deﬂationary and the
exogenous competitor is growing, a one-percent change in the one-year-old stock results in a 0.02
percent change in production. From this analysis, three more properties of the policy function are
derived.
First, as measured by elasticities, the policy is more responsive to the production of the fringe
competitors, xt, than to the one-year-old stock,st; This is true for all states. For example, a 1
percent increase in xt leads to a decrease of between a 0.07 percent and 0.33 percent in production,
while a 1 percent increase in st leads to roughly a 0.02 percent decrease in production. The intuition
behind this result is that, inasmuch as it is a part of current production, xt inﬂuences the market
longer through future stock than through one-year-old stock.
Second, production is more responsive to exogenous state variables when the cost is in a deﬂa-
tionary period (˜ c>0) and exogenous production is contracting (x>31.16). Conversely, production
is less responsive when the macro cost shock is appreciating and exogenous production is growing.
25This reﬂects the eﬀect of consumers’ expectations; since the policy function is a decreasing function
of both ˜ c and x, cost inﬂation and growth in exogenous production imply lower production in the
future. As a result, consumers are convinced that there will not be a drastic price cut in the future.
Consequently, producers do not have to respond to changes in the market environment so much.
As a result, adjustment towards the steady state is slower. With the opposite scenario, where cost
depreciates and the production of fringe competitors contracts, producers have to respond relatively
more, as consumers expect greater production and lower prices. Therefore, the convergence to the
steady state occurs more rapidly than with the inﬂationary phase. This property corresponds to
the result in Kahn (1986), wherein a decreasing return-to-scale cost function helps ﬁrms to credibly
implement a low production plan, although in this case, the cost varies over time. Furthermore, in
the deﬂationary phase of the macro cost shock, consumers correctly expect a future price cut, on
account of which, producers quickly lose their market power. This point is investigated further in
the next section.
Third, the response to the one-year-old stock does not vary a great deal with respect to the
exogenous variables. This is partly due to the fact that, in the next period, the stock will move
from the market to the outside alternative; consequently, the stock does not have a direct impact
on the future market.
5.3 Simulations
In this section, several simulation results are presented to show the dynamics in the market. Unless
otherwise noted, all simulations consist of over 10,000 independent seven-period simulations of the
dynamic model. For the initial condition of st and xt, the actual observations for 1994 are used. For
˜ ct, which cannot be observed directly, we set ˜ c2000 as the calibrated value of ˜ c, based on industry
information and the estimated parameter value.
The Predictive Power of the Model
Table 8 compares the simulated statistics and the observations for total production, new condo-
minium prices and the production of fringe competitors for models I and II. Performance is espe-
cially good for the prices. The second last row in the table reports the percentages of time within
which the predictions fall within the 15 percent intervals from the observations. In both cases,
the percentages for prices are close to 100 percent. For production, however, in models I and II,
26they are 24.4 percent and 37.7 percent, respectively. The performances with respect to production
may indicate the limitations in the assumption that all oligopolistic ﬁrms are homogeneous. For
the rest of the simulation exercises, the set of parameter estimates for model II is adopted because
that model yields higher predictive power. Furthermore, it is statistically more reliable because it
is based on more observations than is the case for model I. Additionally, alternative assumptions
on the number of oligopolistic ﬁrms(J) are explored. These indicate that the predictive power
increases with J, suggesting that the market is closer to being competitive.
Market Power and Proﬁts
The mean prediction of markup, evaluated at the marginal cost, is reported in the last raw of Table
8. The average markup is between 0.48 percent and 0.56 percent; these are small values, and they
indicate that ﬁrms may not possess substantial market power.29
Given our quadratic production costs speciﬁcation, however, markups evaluated at the marginal
costs for ﬁrms are not indicative of proﬁts. The average proﬁt margin measured using the average
costs in simulated data is 8.4 percent and 12.4 percent for models I and II, respectively. These
levels of proﬁt margin are comparable to the proﬁt margins reported in the ﬁnancial statements
of developers during the late 1990s, which suggests that the condominium business yields a proﬁt
margin of about 10 percent.30
The Role of Cost Variations
For the purpose of examining the relationship between production cost trends and the market
power of durable goods producers, we compare the markups in a cost increasing phase and a cost
decreasing phase. To make a valid comparison, the following two paths are compared. The path of
the decreasing phase is generated using the estimated parameter value, and then setting the initial
value of the macro cost shock at ˜ ct = C, where C has a positive value. To see the eﬀect only of the
cost variation trend, the path being compared should initiate from the same marginal cost function
at the beginning. Thus, ¯ c1 +˜ ct should be at the same level and ˜ ct should have the same absolute
value but with a negative sign; consequently, ˜ ct = −C. Producers in both cases then face the same
29In general, the model with the estimated parameter values yields a low level of markup across all ranges of
states where the problem is solved. Using simulations, we assess to what extent an assumption that ﬁrms produce
diﬀerentiated products can lead to higher markups.
30For example, the average operating margin of the ﬁrms in the sample were 8 to 12 percent in 1994-2000. The
proﬁt breakdown estimate for the unit price around 2000, performed by an industry analyst indicates that the margin
was about 10 percent.
27speed of convergence in terms of ˜ ct. To align the value of the marginal cost, the solution of the
producer’s problem, where ¯ c1 equals the sum of the previously set value (24.71 million yen) and
twice the value, is set as the point of comparison (2 × C). This solution is used to simulate the
path in the cost increasing phase. For the initial value of exogenous production and one-year-old
stock, the observed values for 2000 are used in both paths. For the value of C, the terminal value
of the macro cost shock obtained in the estimation, ˜ c2000, is used.
Figure 5 compares the simulated markups over 11 periods; the dotted line indicates the markup
for the cost increasing phase and the solid line indicates that for the cost decreasing phase. At
the initial point, the markup under the increasing phase is 31 percent higher than that under the
decreasing phase. As the time passes, the diﬀerence in markups increases. By the 11th period, the
markup in the increasing phase is 2.9 times more than that of the decreasing phase. This comparison
indicates that the ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly more market power during the cost increasing phase than
during the cost decreasing phase.
Underlying these results is the change in the incentive of producers compared with that under
a time-invariant cost structure. When cost is increasing, a ﬁrm has an incentive to produce more
now rather than later, since it will be more costly to produce in the future. On the other hand,
when cost is decreasing, a ﬁrm has an incentive to postpone production, as it can save on the cost
by accruing a lower marginal cost in the future. Forward-looking consumers are aware of these
incentives to ﬁrms. Therefore, cost increases lead consumers to believe that ﬁrms will not ﬂood the
market in the future; hence, their willingness to pay does not decrease. Conversely, cost decreases
lead to a reduction in a willingness to pay. Hence, the Coase problem of ﬁrms becoming less serious
during the cost increasing phase, but the problem is worse during the cost decreasing phase. Given
that, on average, factor prices in the Tokyo market were on a decreasing trend throughout the 1990s
up through the mid 2000s, this result suggests that condominium developers had more diﬃculty in
making proﬁts during the 1990s than during preceding decades.
Factors of Price Deﬂation between 1994 and 2000
In this section, the contributors to the price deﬂation between 1994 and 2000 are decomposed
using the parameter estimates from model II. The result here, however, should be interpreted with
caution given the way oligopolistic ﬁrms are selected in the estimation.
For this purpose, we obtain the following simulated price paths: (i) the benchmark price path
28reported at the beginning of this section; (ii) the price path where ˜ c, and xt are ﬁxed at the initial
levels for all simulation periods; and (iii) the price path using the actual values of xt and with a
ﬁxed ˜ c. By comparing these series, we are able to obtain how much of the variation in price is
accounted for by increased exogenous competition. Table 9 presents the results of the simulation.
Column (iv) reports the percentage of the price deﬂation since 1994 that is accounted for by the
increased competition caused by exogenous fringe competitors.
Note that the contribution of fringe competitors dropped from 45 percent to 13 percent in 1997
and revived to 25 percent in 1998. For those two years, the overall output dropped compared with
that for 1996. This shift is likely due to the eﬀects of the consumption tax hike introduced in 1997
and the change in the tax preferential system, which was expected to go into eﬀect in 1999. With
the anticipation of the ﬁrst event that was announced in 1994, forward-looking consumers were
apt to engage in last-minute purchases in the period leading up to 1997 and to reduce purchases
following the change in the tax rate.31 In anticipation of the second event, potential buyers had
a strong incentive to postpone their purchases so as to beneﬁt from the new system. Thus, prices
after 1996 up through 1999 decreased due to the components not accommodated for in the model.
In this simulation, all the remaining change is the contribution of ˜ ct. Excluding those two years,
the contribution of xt is about 50 percent. One thing to note is the possibility that xt is correlated
with cost factors. It is likely that, generally speaking, competition intensiﬁes as costs decline.
Nevertheless, this is beyond the scope of this paper, and is left for future research.
Column (v) reports the price path if oligopolistic ﬁrms act as price takers. By comparing this
path with the benchmark path (i), the eﬀect of imperfect competition on the market price can
be measured. Column (vi) reports these measures in percentage terms; they are very close to
zero. On average, the benchmark price is 0.09 percent or 36,000 yen higher than the competitive
price, suggesting that the market power was not a key factor in explaining the divergence of the
condominium prices and land prices that is observed in Figure 1.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the market phenomenon of the primary market for condominiums in Tokyo
between 1994 and 2000. During this period, increased output and persistent falls in the prices of
31For a description of these events, see footnote 26.
29condominiums, land, and other factors of production were observed. The main question posed here
is whether market power played any role in explaining this outcome.
We focus on the durability of the condominiums and the presence of a secondary market, and
developed a dynamic oligopoly model that is based on Esteban (2001). The model incorporates
an important feature found in this industry: the persistent factor price variations that aﬀect the
dynamics of the market on account of the expectations of all agents. This framework allows for an
investigation of the relationship between the trend in production costs and the degree of market
power possessed by the durable goods producers.
The structural parameters of the proposed model are estimated using a three-step estimation
procedure, one which includes a nested GMM method, in which the algorithm solves the dynamic
programming problem of producers for each evaluation of the GMM objective function.
For each estimated set of parameter values, the model yields an optimal policy for oligopolists
as a decreasing function for all state variables (i.e., condominium stock, exogenous production and
macro cost shock). The optimal policy is the most responsive to the macro cost shock, followed
by exogenous competitors as measured by elasticities. Furthermore, the model shows that ﬁrms
respond to changes in the market environment more drastically during the deﬂationary phase than
during the inﬂationary phase.
In the estimation and simulation experiments, we ﬁnd two major results. First, the data
provides no evidence that the ﬁrms in the primary market had substantial market power in this
industry. Contrary to our conjecture, therefore, imperfect competition did not play a role dur-
ing this period. Second, increasing and decreasing expectations on production cost trends have
asymmetric eﬀects to the market power of condominium producers: an increase in their markup
when cost increases are anticipated is signiﬁcantly higher than a decrease in markup when the same
magnitude of cost decreases are anticipated.
Those results may call for caution on the part of policymakers when considering the eﬀects of
policy instruments, such as modiﬁcations in the tax codes and the evaluation of merger cases. It is
particularly relevant in recent years because the land prices started to exhibit an inﬂationary trend
in some areas in Tokyo in 2003 and construction costs started to increase in 2005.
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33APPENDIX
A Solution Algorithm—the Collocation Method
With few exceptions, the Markov decision problems have no analytical solutions. In such cases, one
needs to rely on the numerical solution—which is an approximation of the true solution—in order to
understand the dynamics of the model. We describe here in this note one of the solution methods for
a discrete-time continuous Markov decision problem, the collocation method. Among the diﬃculties
in solving such problems is the fact that the unknown of the dynamic programming is not a
particular variable, but rather consists of two functions, usually known as the value function and
the optimal policy function. In collocation methods, this diﬃculty is overcome by approximating
the value function by using a linear combination of prespeciﬁed functions, called a basis function,
and evaluating it at predetermined state nodes. For details, see Miranda and Fackler (2002).
To simplify the notation, s denotes a vector of state variables and q denotes the choice variable.
The function g(s,q) describes the transition of a state vector, given the choice of a ﬁrm, in the




The collocation method suggests an approximation of this value function, V (·), with a linear
combination of n prespeciﬁed functions; these functions are evaluated only at the prespeciﬁed n





where cj is a scalar and φj(s) is a/the nonlinear function. The numerical analysis theory oﬀers
several choices of functional form for φj(s) and the associated state nodes, such as the Cheby-
shev polynomial basis and node, and the piecewise polynomial splines and nodes. Based on this









The task then is to obtain the optimal policy function, h(·), and coeﬃcient, cj,j=1 ,2,...,n..
Once φj(·)s and s are selected, the optimal policy and value function can be obtained using the
algorithm below. Before describing the algorithm, several notations need to be introduced. Let s
be the vector (or matrix if s is a vector) of interpolation nodes [s1,s 2,...sn]. Using φj(·)s and s,w e
can construct a matrix, Φ, in which the ijth element is φj(sk), where sk is the kth interpolation
node. Note that this matrix will not change over the solution algorithm. Let c =[ c1,c 2,...,cn]  be
the vector of the approximation coeﬃcients. Let v be the column vector [v(s1),v(s2),...,v(sn)]  ,
where sk denotes each interpolation node. We can then write (26) in vector notation:
v =Φc.
The outer loop solves for the value function approximation (obtaining coeﬃcient value, c∗
j, j =
1,2,...n), while the inner loop solves for the optimal policy and the associated value function. Note
34that the superscripts for c and h indicate for the number of iteration steps involved/found in the
outer loop in the description below.
Step 1 At the beginning of the program, both the initial guess for the coeﬃcient vector, c0 (which
approximates the value function), and the initial guess for the optimal policy, h0(·), are
determined.
Step 2 Given ci, the inner loop solves the Bellman equation and the return policy function and the
value at the interpolation nodes, s. More speciﬁcally, for each interpolation node, s, we obtain









∂q = 0, where
φ
 
j is the ﬁrst derivative of φj. To evaluate this condition, hi has to be approximated with
Φc∗. This allows us to gain the expected future production. Note that Φ is the same matrix
for the approximation of v. This step yields q = hi+1(s) and the optimal value, vi+1(s).
Step 3 Given vi+1, ci can be updated by the following rule: ci+1 =Φ −1vi+1. Alternatively, it can
be updated using Newton’s method, which uses the iteration rule,
ci+1 = ci +
 
Φ − vi+1  −1  
Φci − vi+1 
,
where vi+1  is the Jacobian of vi+1. It goes back to step 2 until
 
 ci+1 − ci 
  reaches a particular
level of tolerance.
Note that Miranda and Fackler (2002) provides the MATLAB toolkit, which constructs a vector
from the basis function and the corresponding interpolations nodes with the users type of choice.
B Imputing Future Prices in the Secondary Market
As mentioned in section 4.1., not all condominium units are traded every year, and not all of the
data for those that were traded are available. Thus, future prices (p∗
jt+n) must be imputed from
the observed data. We followed two steps, as described in this sequel.
First, the secondary market data from the classiﬁed magazines documented in section 4.1. are
matched with the primary market data by name and address. Of the entire primary market sample,
about 27 percent of the entries correspond to at least one secondary market entry between 1992
and 2002.
Second, we estimate an imputation equation in the following speciﬁcation. Note that we use
prices per square meter instead of unit prices so as to control for size diﬀerences:
log(p∗
jt+n)=a0 + a1 log(p∗
jt)+a 
3x + ujt, (27)
where p∗
jt is the price of the property when it was sold as new, x is a vector of the characteristics
of the condominiums, inclusive of cohort dummies and transaction year dummies, and ujt is an
error term. Note that the OLS estimation of (27) is inclined to be biased, as the error term ujt,
is likely to be correlated with regressors due to selection bias. There are at least two potential
sources of selection bias. First, prices in the secondary market are only observed if properties are
on the market (i.e., if there is incidental truncation). Second, as the sample is drawn from weekly
35classiﬁed magazines, only the subgroup for secondary market transactions is included. To correct
these biases, Heckman’s two–step method is applied. Table10 reports the estimation of equation
(27) for selected variables from the OLS and selection model. For vector x, we include the log of
total units sold initially in the same phase, the log of the distance from the nearest train station,
the log of the total area that was sold in the same phase, birth cohort dummies, transaction year
dummies, vintage dummies, ward dummies, building height dummies, ﬂoor plan dummies, and
railroad dummies. The selection of variables is based on Ono, Takatsuji, and Shimizu (2002), who
study the hedonic price index using data from the same source as this paper. As our data do not
include some information, such as the detailed characteristics of each unit, an initial price p∗
jt is
included in the regression to control for unobserved quality variation. In both models, the higher
the price in the secondary market, the higher the initial price in the primary market. The negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates for the distance from the nearest train station suggests that the
future value of the unit is higher if it is closer to a train station. This is because, generally speaking,
most people commute to work or school by train and stores tend to be concentrated around train
stations. Thus, the distance to a train station measures the degree of convenience. As expected,
the estimates of the vintage dummies are all negative and signiﬁcant, and the magnitude increases
monotonically with the vintage, suggesting that older units are less expensive. The transaction
year dummies are negative and monotonically decrease with the year. This implies that properties
have become less expensive in recent years, something which reﬂects the overall housing market
trend. The birth cohort dummies are positive and increase with the year, until 1996. There is no
distinct incident that seems to drive this result. A comparison of models (a) and (b) shows the
direction of the bias due to selection. The variables whose coeﬃcients are the most biased are the
vintage and year dummies; the coeﬃcients for the birth cohort dummies are underestimated in
terms of magnitude. The coeﬃcients for the vintage dummies are underestimated, while those for
the transaction year dummies are overestimated.
C Calculation of the Terminal Condition for ˜ c
The terminal condition for ˜ c, both for estimations and simulations, is calibrated based on the costs
and proﬁt breakdown estimate for the unit price around 2000 performed by an industry analyst.32
First, from this information, we know that the average proﬁt per unit was approximately 10
percent around 2000. Since the weighted average price of new condominiums (age zero) in the data
for the year 2000 was 4.78 million yen, the average cost of production is set at 4.32 million yen
(= 4.78∗.9). Second, since the average cost corresponds to the expression in the text, ˜ c+¯ c1+¯ c2∗q,
and ¯ c1 is ﬁxed to 24.71, the value of ˜ c2000 is obtained using average production of ﬁve ﬁrms for q.
32We thank Koichi Hiraga for providing this information.
36D Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of Firms and Concentration Measures
(A) number of (B)number of single (C)
year active ﬁrms appearance a =( B)/(A) 5 -ﬁrmb 10-ﬁrmb 15-ﬁrmb HHIc
1992 89 35 0.393 0.383 0.523 0.614 0.046
1993 111 26 0.234 0.402 0.538 0.618 0.062
1994 205 56 0.273 0.309 0.442 0.540 0.032
1995 228 48 0.211 0.293 0.416 0.498 0.027
1996 227 29 0.128 0.297 0.412 0.501 0.037
1997 231 35 0.152 0.306 0.443 0.511 0.036
1998 221 32 0.145 0.259 0.385 0.480 0.026
1999 230 33 0.143 0.312 0.417 0.495 0.032
2000 231 44 0.190 0.317 0.433 0.516 0.030
Total 1,773 338 0.191 0.310 0.433 0.518 0.034
a The number of ﬁrms that appeared in the dataset only once during the sample period.
b x-ﬁrm concentration
ratio is the sum of the market share of the top x ﬁrms.
c Herﬁndahl Index.
37Table 2: Summary Statistics a
Variable Notation Obs Mean Weighted Std. Min Max
Meanb Dev.
Distance from NTS c dist 5,522 701.31 734.44 913.61 0 13,880
Height of the building height 5,522 8.72 9.61 4.39 2 54
Total units for sale in a given phase qt 5,522 26.33 – 20.54 1 319
Average size of the units (m2) size 5,522 66.59 65.35 34.92 20 807
Number of developers – 5,522 1.21 1.13 0.45 1 4
Whether secondary market data – 5,522 0.27 – 0.45 0 1
are available
Unit Price (0,000 yen)
Primary market (age 0) p0
t 5,522 5,209 4,905 3,221 1,559 73,706
Secondary market (age 1) p1
t 5,522 4,749 4,548 2,810 1,316 70,086
Secondary market (age 2) p2
t 5,522 4,583 4,380 2,740 1,179 66,686
Production by an oligopolistic ﬁrm
5 ﬁrms qt 35 1,475 1,033 443 4,054
10 ﬁrms qt 70 1,025 871 0 4,054
a Each observation corresponds to a group of units in one building or one development project sold at the same phase.
b Weights are the units in each phase.
c NTS stands for “nearest train station.”
38Table 3: Fixed Parameters
Description Notation Value Unit
Common discount rate β 0.975
1-period survival rate δ 0.990
Scrap price ¯ p 42.3 million yen
Market size M 3.514 million households
Number of ﬁrms J 5, 10
Steady state cost ¯ c1 24.710 million yen
Variance of macro cost shock σ2
η 1
39Table 4: Parameter Estimates for the Process of xt: the First-step estimation
Model I Model II
5 ﬁrms 10 ﬁrms
ϑ 0.878 0.897
(0.203)∗∗∗ (.1829)∗∗∗









Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Stars refer to the sig-
niﬁcance level of a t-test.
∗= sig-





a The standard error are ob-
tained by the delta method.
40Table 5: Demand Parameter Estimates: the Second-step Estimation
OLS GMM
α 0.016 0.328




















Robust standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted





41Table 6: Cost Parameter Estimates: the Third-step Estimation
Parameter Explanation Model I Model II
5 ﬁrms 10 ﬁrms
ρ AR(1) Coeﬃcient 0.9443∗∗∗ 0.9552∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0012)
¯ c2 Cost Parameter 3.5812∗∗∗ 5.8332∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0045)
σ2
λ Standard Deviation of 0.1664 0.096
Idiosyncratic Production Shock (1.2056) (1.0383)
˜ cd
2000 terminal value of ˜ c 14.5151 10.4544
N3 5 7 0
a Robust standard error is given in the parentheses.
b Stars refer to the signiﬁcance
level of a t-test.
∗= signiﬁcant at 10% level,
∗∗=signiﬁcant at 5% level,
∗∗∗=signiﬁcant
at 1% level.
c Standard error is obtained by the delta method.
d The detail for this
value is described in Appendix C.
42Table 7: Responsiveness of Policy Functions to State Variables
˜ c Inﬂation ˜ c Deﬂation
xt Growth st 0.023 st 0.018
xt 0.067 xt 0.131
˜ ct 0.037 ˜ ct 1.034
xt Contraction st 0.025 st 0.010
xt 0.329 xt 0.184
˜ ct 0.040 ˜ ct 0.803
a All ﬁgures are measured in elasticities in abso-
lute value.
43Table 8: The Model’s Performance






Mean Observation 7.4 49.4 10.3 49.4
(Standard Deviation) (1.9) (1.9) (2.1) (1.9)
Mean Prediction 5.4 49.5 10.3 49.0
Mean Deviation from Observations b 3.5 7.3 3.3 7.8
Mean % of times that prediction 24.4 100.0 37.5 100.0
falls in 15% interval
from observations
Markup (s.d.) 0.56 (0.0005) 0.48 (0.0007)
a The mean is taken over time periods.
b Let xt and b xtmdenote the observation in year t and
the prediction for yeart in m’th draw respectively. The deviation is calculated by following




m(b xtm − xt)
2.
44Table 9: Decomposition of Contributors to Price Deﬂation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Year Benchmark Fix both Fix Contribution Competitive Eﬀect of
xt &˜ ct ˜ ct (%) Price Imperfection(%)
1994 49.88 49.88 49.88 – – –
1995 48.97 49.88 49.48 43.63 48.919 0.098
1996 48.23 49.88 49.12 45.65 48.182 0.094
1997 48.41 49.88 49.69 12.63 48.360 0.110
1998 47.95 49.88 49.39 24.96 47.900 0.103
1999 47.10 49.88 48.50 49.74 47.064 0.082
2000 46.60 49.88 47.99 57.63 46.569 0.071



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
year...
Annual Supply of New Condominiums Building Construction Cost Index
Land Price Index (residential) New Condominium Price Index
Source:The Real Estate Economic Institute , “National Condominium Market
Trend, 1984-2002”, Statistics Bureau,“Statistics Yearbook”
Figure 1: Key Variables in the Tokyo Condominium Market—1985-2000

























































































































Figure 4: The Solution at st =3 1 ,160






















Figure 5: Simulated Markups—Inﬂation vs. Deﬂation
51